Acta Analytica

, Volume 23, Issue 2, pp 161–176

A Critique of Armstrong’s Truthmaking Account of Possibility


DOI: 10.1007/s12136-008-0027-z

Cite this article as:
Kalhat, J. Acta Anal (2008) 23: 161. doi:10.1007/s12136-008-0027-z


In this paper I argue against Armstrong’s recent truthmaking account of possibility. I show that the truthmaking account presupposes modality in a number of different ways, and consequently that it is incapable of underwriting a genuine reduction of modality. I also argue that Armstrong’s account faces serious difficulties irrespective of the question of reduction; in particular, I argue that his Entailment and Possibility Principles are both false.


Armstrong Truthmakers Possibility Reduction Instantiation Combinatorialism 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophisches SeminarUniversität ZürichZürichSwitzerland

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