Acta Analytica

, Volume 23, Issue 1, pp 69–89 | Cite as

Thing and Object

Article
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Abstract

There is a fundamental ontological difference between two kinds of entity: things and objects. Unlike things, objects are not identical to any fusion of particulars. Unlike things, objects do not have mereological parts. While things are ontologically innocent, objects are not. Objects are meaty. I defend the distinction between things and objects, and provide an account of the nature of objects.

Keywords

Objects Things Mereology Ontology Composition 

Notes

Acknowledgement

With thanks to David-Braddon-Mitchell for helpful discussion of these issues, and to the Australian Research Council for funding.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyThe University of SydneySydneyAustralia

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