Acta Analytica

, Volume 22, Issue 4, pp 281–300 | Cite as

Transglobal Evidentialism-Reliabilism

Article

Abstract

We propose an approach to epistemic justification that incorporates elements of both reliabilism and evidentialism, while also transforming these elements in significant ways. After briefly describing and motivating the non-standard version of reliabilism that Henderson and Horgan call “transglobal” reliabilism, we harness some of Henderson and Horgan’s conceptual machinery to provide a non-reliabilist account of propositional justification (i.e., evidential support). We then invoke this account, together with the notion of a transglobally reliable belief-forming process, to give an account of doxastic justification.

Keywords

Evidentialism Reliabilism Justification Transglobal reliability 

Notes

Acknowledgements

The precursor of this paper, a talk entitled “Objective Epistemic Likelihood and Particularist Epistemic Normativity,” was presented on May 28, 2007 at the Bled Epistemology conference. Several people furnished important comments and objections, among these Mylan Engel, Alvin Goldman, Michael Lynch, Bruce Russell, Ernest Sosa, and Michael Tooley. Our thanks to them, and also to Mark Timmons.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Nebraska-LincolnLincolnUSA
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of ArizonaTucsonUSA
  3. 3.University of LjubljanaLjubljanaSlovenia

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