Acta Analytica

, Volume 22, Issue 4, pp 267–279

What Is Entitlement?


DOI: 10.1007/s12136-007-0012-y

Cite this article as:
Casullo, A. Acta Anal (2007) 22: 267. doi:10.1007/s12136-007-0012-y


In his seminal paper, “Content Preservation,” Tyler Burge defends an original account of testimonial knowledge. The originality of the account is due, in part, to the fact that it is cast within a novel epistemic framework. The central feature of that framework is the introduction of the concept of entitlement, which is alleged to be a distinctive type of positive epistemic support or warrant. Entitlement and justification, according to Burge, are sub-species of warrant. Justification is the internalist form of warrant, but entitlement is epistemically externalist. My focus in this paper is Burge’s conception of entitlement, and there are three primary issues that I wish to address. What is the relationship between entitlement and the more traditional concept of justification? In what sense is entitlement epistemically externalist? Has Burge introduced a new epistemic concept or merely coined a new term for a familiar epistemic concept?


Access Entitlement Externalism Internalism Justification Warrant 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Nebraska-LincolnLincolnUSA

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