Acta Analytica

, Volume 22, Issue 2, pp 139–153 | Cite as

A Logic of Practical Reasoning

original article

Abstract

In this paper my primary aim is to present a logical system of practical reasoning that can be used to assess the validity of practical arguments, that is, arguments with a practical judgment as conclusion. I begin with a critical evaluation of other approaches to this issue and argue that they are inadequate. On the basis of these considerations, I explain in Sect. 2 the informal conception of practical validity and introduce in Sect. 3 the logical system P, which is an extension of propositional logic and can be used to assess the validity of a wide range of practical arguments. In the last section, I apply this system to some examples of practical reasoning in order to demonstrate how it can be used in practice.

Keywords

Practical reasoning Ethics Practical arguments Practical inference Validity Practical logic 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The University of ZambiaLusakaZambia

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