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Acta Analytica

, Volume 21, Issue 3, pp 23–40 | Cite as

A proper understanding of Millikan

  • Justine Kingsbury
Language And Mind

Abstract

Ruth Millikan’s teleological theory of mental content is complex and often misunderstood. This paper motivates and clarifies some of the complexities of the theory, and shows that paying careful attention to its details yields answers to a number of common objections to teleological theories, in particular, the problem of novel mental states, the problem of functionally false beliefs, and problems about indeterminacy or multiplicity of function.

Keywords

Millikan teleosemantics teleology content proper function 

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Copyright information

© Transaction Publishers 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Justine Kingsbury
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Philosophy and Religious StudiesUniversity of WaikatoHamiltonNew Zealand

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