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Acta Analytica

, Volume 19, Issue 33, pp 189–208 | Cite as

The riddle of aesthetic principles

  • Vojko Strahovnik
Analytic Philosophy In Slovenia

Abstract

The problem of aesthetic principles and that of the nature of aesthetic reasons get confronted. If aesthetic reasons play an important role in our aesthetic evaluations and judgments, then both some general aesthetic principles and rules could support them (aesthetic generalism) or again their nature may be particularistic (aesthetic particularism). A recent argument in support of aesthetic generalism as proposed by Oliver Conolly and Bashshar Haydar is presented and criticized for its misapprehension of particularism. Their position of irreversible aesthetic generalism is questioned. Aesthetic particularism is restated by the help of proposals by Jonathan Dancy’s version of moral particularism.

Keywords

aesthetic principles reasons aesthetic generalism aesthetic particularism moral particularism thick and thin properties 

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Copyright information

© Springer 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Vojko Strahovnik
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Ljubljana, Faculty of ArtsLjubljanaSlovenia

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