Metaphysica

, Volume 13, Issue 2, pp 183–194 | Cite as

The Problem of Universals, Realism, and God

Article

Abstract

There has been much discussion of late on what exactly the Problem of Universals is and is not. Of course answers to these questions and many more like it depend on what is supposed to be explained by a solution to the Problem of Universals. In this paper, I seek to establish two claims: first, that when the facts (explanada) to be explained and the kind of explanation needed are elucidated, it will be shown that the Problem of Universals is a real metaphysical problem, not a pseudo problem; secondly, the facts whose explanation posed the problem in the Problem of Universals still provide reason to think realism regarding universals is true, even if God exists.

Keywords

Explanation God Nominalism Platonism Realism Universals 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The College at SoutheasternWake ForestUSA
  2. 2.DurhamUSA

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