Metaphysica

, Volume 13, Issue 2, pp 145–153

The Limits of Hylomorphism

Article

Abstract

Aristotle’s theory of physical objects, hylomorphism, has resurfaced in contemporary metaphysics. In its current version, hylomorphism is proposed as a general theory of mereology, its purview extending beyond material objects to chemical composites, events, and non-physical mathematical, linguistic, and musical objects. While I agree that hylomorphism works well in all of the newly proposed applications, it fails as a theory of properties and their parts. I show that this is the case and then theorize about why this is so.

Keywords

Hylomorphism Mereology Property parts Structure 

References

  1. Fine, Kit (2006) “In Defense of Three-Dimensionalism” Journal of Philosophy Vol 103, No. 12Google Scholar
  2. Johnston, Mark (2006) “Hylomorphism” Journal of Philosophy Vol 103, No. 12Google Scholar
  3. Koslicki, Kathrin. The Structure of Objects, (2008) Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  4. Oderberg, David. Real Essentialism, (2007) Routledge Press, LondonGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyEastern Illinois UniversityCharlestonUSA

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