Metaphysica

, 12:137

Dennett on Free Will

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Abstract

Daniel Dennett maintains that regardless of determinism humans are both free to act and have a meaningful existence. Yet Dennett’s compatibilism entails that a felicity-advancing interaction with the world is all that we could wish for, which seems false. I also argue that Dennett’s attempt to define the terms central to this metaphysical debate fails. The weaknesses of Dennett’s case suggest that he is motivated more by his desire to complete the naturalistic project than he is by the pursuit of philosophical coherence.

Keywords

Dennett Compatibilism Incompatibilism Determinism Naturalism 

References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Langside CollegeGlasgowUK

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