On Three Arguments against Endurantism
Judith Thomson, David Lewis, and Ted Sider have each formulated different arguments that apparently pose problems for our ordinary claims of diachronic sameness, i.e., claims in which we assert that familiar, concrete objects survive (or persist) through time by enduring as numerically the same entity despite minor changes in their intrinsic and relational properties. In this paper, I show that all three arguments fail, in a rather obvious way—they beg the question—and so even though there may be arguments that provide grounds to fuss about whether our ordinary claims of diachronic sameness are defective, Thomson, Lewis, and Sider’s arguments are not among them.
KeywordsEndurantism Perdurantism Mereology Temporary intrinsics Leibniz’s law
I would like to thank Ali Kazmi, Rafal Urbaniak, and, in particular, Meg Wallace for comments on sections of (ancestors) of this paper.
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