, Volume 12, Issue 1, pp 45–50 | Cite as

Exaggerating the Importance of Diachronic Base Property Exemplification in Moral Supervenience

  • Jorn SonderholmEmail author


Jeff Wisdom has recently defended the proposition that any view of moral supervenience worth its salt must incorporate a diachronic view of base property exemplification. Let us call the proposition defended by Wisdom “p.” In this paper, I try to show that Wisdom has offered no good reasons for accepting p. My argumentative strategy proceeds along two separate tracks. First, I try to show that the thought experiment Wisdom employs in order to underwrite p does not offer the intended support for the proposition. Secondly, I try to show that even if the problems with the thought experiment in question are ignored, there is at least one other reason for thinking that Wisdom has not offered a convincing argument in favor of p.


Moral supervenience Base property exemplification Global supervenience 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyGeorge Washington UniversityWashingtonUSA

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