This paper provides an outline of a theory of causal truthmaking according to which contingent truths are made true by causal facts and dispositional mechanisms. These facts and mechanisms serve to account for the truth of propositions by explaining in a non-epistemic fashion why they have come about as truths. Given that negative causation is allowed for, we are able to provide truthmakers for negative truths without making appeal to negative facts, lacks or absences. The paper takes its starting point in the following claims by George Molnar: (1) the world is everything that exists; (2) everything that exists is positive; (3) some negative claims about the world are true; and (4) every true claim about the world is made true by something that exists. The conclusion is reached that we can keep (1–4) in a consistent manner if causal truthmaking is permitted.
KeywordsTruthmaking Causation Probability Explanation Negative truth
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