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Metaphysica

, Volume 11, Issue 2, pp 137–151 | Cite as

The Leibniz’s Law Problem (For Stage Theory)

  • Stephen WrightEmail author
Article

Abstract

Stage theorists invoke the idea of counterpart relations to make sense of how objects are able to persist despite their claim that an object is identical with a single instantaneous stage. According to stage theorists, an object persists if and only if it has a later counterpart that bears the appropriate counterpart relation of identity to it. Whilst objects can and do persist, stages cannot and do not. This seems to amount to a refutation of Leibniz’s law. Stage theorists think that the nature of the counterpart relation invoked depends on how it is that the object is referred to. In this paper, I argue that the context sensitivity that they invoke here gives stage theorists a response to the Leibniz’s Law Problem.

Keywords

Stage theory Persistence Identity Counterpart theory Leibniz’s Law Problem 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank in particular Ted Sider for his patient assistance in preparing this paper and also Tobias Hansson Wahlberg for his comments on an earlier draft of the work.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.King’s College LondonLondonUK

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