Metaphysica

, Volume 11, Issue 1, pp 49–61

The Individuation of Causal Powers by Events (and Consequences of the Approach)

Article
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Abstract

In this paper, I explore the notion of a “causal power,” particularly as it is relevant to a theory of properties whereby properties are individuated by the causal powers they bestow on the objects that instantiate them. I take as my target certain eliminativist positions that argue that certain kinds of properties (or relations) do not exist because they fail to bestow unique causal powers on objects. In reply, I argue that the notion of causal powers is inextricably bound up with our notion of what an event is, and not only is there disagreement as to which theory of events is appropriate, but on the three prevailing theories, it can be shown that the eliminativists arguments do not follow.

Keywords

Properties Events Causal powers 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Washington University in St. LouisSt. LouisUSA

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