Three arguments for the conclusion that objects cannot endure in B-time even if they remain intrinsically unchanged are examined: Carter and Hestevold’s enduring-objects-as-universals argument (American Philosophical Quarterly 31(4):269–283, 1994) and Barker and Dowe’s paradox 1 and paradox 2 (Analysis 63(2):106–114, 2003, Analysis 65(1):69–74, 2005). All three are shown to fail.
KeywordsB-time Endurance Mereology Paradox Persistence Universals
The paper was presented at the Swedish national philosophy congress, “Filosofidagarna”, Lund 12–14 June 2009. I thank the participants for helpful comments. Thanks are also due to Anna-Sofia Maurin, Nils-Eric Sahlin and Lena Wahlberg.
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