Metaphysica

, 10:175 | Cite as

Endurance Per Se in B-time

Article

Abstract

Three arguments for the conclusion that objects cannot endure in B-time even if they remain intrinsically unchanged are examined: Carter and Hestevold’s enduring-objects-as-universals argument (American Philosophical Quarterly 31(4):269–283, 1994) and Barker and Dowe’s paradox 1 and paradox 2 (Analysis 63(2):106–114, 2003, Analysis 65(1):69–74, 2005). All three are shown to fail.

Keywords

B-time Endurance Mereology Paradox Persistence Universals  

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyLund UniversityLundSweden

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