, 10:215 | Cite as

Review: E. J. Lowe, Personal Agency

The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, xvi + 222pp. ISBN 978-0-19-92174-4. £ 35.00/$ 70.00
  • Andreas GyrEmail author
Original Paper

In the last 35 years or so, weak, i.e. non-substantival, forms of dualism—the most common of which go by the name of property dualism or non-reductive physicalism—have gradually taken the place of strict, i.e., reductive or eliminative, forms of physicalistic monism as the metaphysical standard position in the philosophy of mind. This surprising revival of a dualistic stance is mainly due to the fact that in the view of an increasing number of philosophers strict physicalism is simply not—and never will be—able to provide an answer to what are the two most decisive problems for any possible account of the mind–body relation: the problem of qualia and the problem of mental causation. But whereas most philosophers seem to be fairly happy with a weak form of dualism when it comes to the problem of qualia, the problem of mental causation has recently come under suspicion of presumably demanding a much stronger form of dualism—if any. For, if the mental as mentalreally is to make a causal...


Causal Power Mental Property Mental Causation Metaphysical Possibility Substance Dualism 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institut für PhilosophieHumboldt-Universität zu BerlinBerlinGermany

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