Metaphysica

, 10:135

Properties that Four-Dimensional Objects Cannot Have

Original Paper
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Abstract

The paper argues that four-dimensionalism is incompatible with the existence of “additively cumulative” properties, including mass, volume, and electrical charge. These properties add up over disjoint objects: for example, the mass of a whole composed of two disjoint objects is a sum of the individual masses of the objects. The difficulty with such properties for four-dimensionalism stems from the way this theory makes persistence depend on the existence of disjoint objects at disjoint times. I consider various possible responses to this difficulty and conclude that they all fail.

Keywords

Four-dimensionalism Persistence Perdurance Endurance Temporal parts Mass Properties 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of HaifaHaifaIsrael

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