, Volume 10, Issue 1, pp 49–63 | Cite as

Ryle and Intentionality

  • Laird AddisEmail author
Original Paper


After some opening comments on how I think one should approach the philosophy of mind, I look at what relatively little Gilbert Ryle had to say explicitly about intentionality, that occurring almost exclusively in his several papers on phenomenology. Then, I discuss the notion of intentionality with respect to the doctrines of The Concept of Mind, although neither the word nor the idea, strictly speaking, appears anywhere in the book. Following more exposition of my own views, including an argument I have made for a certain specific theory of intentionality, I close with some reflections on Ryle as a modern-day Aristotelian.


Ryle Intentionality Mind Phenomenology 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The Department of PhilosophyThe University of IowaIowa CityUSA

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