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Metaphysica

, Volume 9, Issue 2, pp 173–191 | Cite as

Backwards Causation, Time, and the Open Future

  • Kristie MillerEmail author
Original Paper

Abstract

Here are some intuitions we have about the nature of space and time. There is something fundamentally different about the past, present, and future. What is definitive of the past is that the past events are fixed. What is definitive of the future is that future events are not fixed. What is definitive of the present is that it marks the objective ontological border between the past and the future and, by doing so, instantiates a particularly salient phenomenological property of “nowness.” Call the combination of these intuitions according to which there exists an objective present, a fixed past, and an open future, the intuitive view. I argue that, given the intuitive view, the possibility of backwards causation—and hence, for instance, backwards time travel—is problematic.

Keywords

Open Future Universe Model Objective Present Extrinsic Property Intuitive View 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Philosophical and Historical InquiryThe University of SydneySydneyAustralia
  2. 2.The Centre for TimeThe University of SydneySydneyAustralia

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