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Metaphysica

, Volume 9, Issue 2, pp 139–157 | Cite as

In Defence of Pan-Dispositionalism

  • Simon BostockEmail author
Original Paper

Abstract

Pan-Dispositionalism – the view that all properties (and relations) are irreducibly dispositional – currently appears to have no takers amongst major analytic metaphysicians. There are those, such as Mumford, who are open to the idea but remain uncommitted. And there are those, such as Ellis and Molnar, who accept that some properties are irreducibly dispositional but argue that not all are. In this paper, I defend Pan-Dispositionalism against this ‘Moderate’ Dispositionalism.

Keywords

Ontology Dispositionalism Laws of nature Property realism 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy Department, University of SheffieldSheffieldUK

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