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Metaphysica

, Volume 9, Issue 1, pp 79–91 | Cite as

How to Derive a ‘Not’ from an ‘Is’: A Defense of the Incompatibility View of Negative Truths

  • Michael VeberEmail author
Original Paper

Abstract

Truthmaker maximalism is the claim that every truth has a truthmaker. The case of negative truths leads some philosophers to postulate negative states of affairs or to give up on truthmaker maximalism. This paper defends a version of the incompatibility view of negative truths. Negative truths can be made true by positive facts, and thus, truthmaker maximalism can be maintained without postulating negative states of affairs.

Keywords

Armstrong D.M. Ontology Negative truths Truthmakers 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyEast Carolina UniversityGreenvilleUSA

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