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Metaphysica

, Volume 9, Issue 1, pp 33–55 | Cite as

Persistence, Ontic Vagueness and Identity: Towards a Substantialist Four–dimensionalism

  • Enrique RomeralesEmail author
Original Paper
  • 96 Downloads

Abstract

Four-dimensionalism, the stage theory version in particular, has been defended as the best solution for avoiding vagueness in regards to composition, persistence and identity. Stage theory is highly problematic by itself, and the two views usually packed with it, unrestricted composition and counterpart theory, are a heavy burden. However, dispensing with these two views, four-dimensionalism could avoid vague persistence by issuing a criterion that would establish sharp temporal boundaries for the existence of genuine entities (simples, molecules and living organisms). This would avoid vague existence and vague identity, but in a way that is still compatible with endurantism. Nevertheless, a minimal (substantialist) four-dimensionalism, a worm perdurantist ontology, would fit better with the unique way in which organisms persist: by retaining both identity and intrinsic change.

Keywords

Persistence Vagueness Four-dimensionalism Perdurance Stages Substance Identity 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Departamento de Filosofía, Facultad de Filosofía y LetrasUniversidad Autónoma de MadridMadridSpain

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