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Metaphysica

, Volume 8, Issue 1, pp 79–96 | Cite as

A Novel Category of Vague Abstracta

  • Jeffrey GoodmanEmail author
Original Paper
  • 61 Downloads

Abstract

Much attention has been given to the question of ontic vagueness, and the issues usually center around whether certain paradigmatically concrete entities - cats, clouds, mountains, etc. - are vague in the sense of having indeterminate spatial boundaries. In this paper, however, I wish to focus on a way in which some abstracta seem to be locationally vague. To begin, I will briefly cover some territory already covered regarding certain types of “traditional” abstracta and the ways they are currently alleged to be vague. I then wish to discuss two types of “nontraditional” abstracta and the sense in which I think some of these objects are locationally vague. I will next reexamine some of the traditional abstracta and discuss whether any of these objects are locationally vague in the novel way suggested for the nontraditional sorts. I’ll finish by discussing objections, and conclude with some remarks about characterizing the abstract/concrete distinction.

Keywords

Fictional Character Spatiotemporal Location Determinate Location Vague Object Concrete Entity 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy and Religion, MSC 7504James Madison UniversityHarrisonburgUSA

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