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Metaphysica

, Volume 8, Issue 1, pp 29–43 | Cite as

“Property Possession as Identity: A Response to Dufour”

  • P.X. MonaghanEmail author
Original Paper
  • 67 Downloads

Introduction

What is property possession? Some might think that to answer this question we must first settle the dispute between those who think it is some sort of relation of instantiation that entities bear to properties that are in some sense exterior to them, and those who think it is some sort of relation of inherence that entities bear to properties that are in some sense interior to them. But in my opinion, this dispute is a mere symptom of the underlying disease. In my opinion, to answer the question we must first ask: How it is possible for one entity to possess a second entity as a property in the first place? Only once we attempt to answer the second question can we see the answer to the first one. For whereas it is apparently widely believed to be possible for one entity to possess a second entity as a property, that belief is false, regardless of whether that property is exterior to that entity, or whether it is interior to it instead.

Accordingly, I argued in a recent...

Keywords

Specific Relation Specific Entity Property Possession Substratum Theory Bundle Theory 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of IowaIowa CityUSA

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