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Knowledge, Technology & Policy

, Volume 14, Issue 1, pp 34–49 | Cite as

McGregor’s theory Y vs. Bentham’s panopticism: Toward a critique of the economic theory of agency

  • David Ellerman
Articles
  • 183 Downloads

Keywords

Intrinsic Motivation Agency Theory Extrinsic Motivation Internal Locus External Locus 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Transaction publishers 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • David Ellerman

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