Skip to main content
Log in

Why Psychology Cannot be an Empirical Science

  • Regular Article
  • Published:
Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The current empirical paradigm for psychological research is criticized because it ignores the irreversibility of psychological processes, the infinite number of influential factors, the pseudo-empirical nature of many hypotheses, and the methodological implications of social interactivity. An additional point is that the differences and correlations usually found are much too small to be useful in psychological practice and in daily life. Together, these criticisms imply that an objective, accumulative, empirical and theoretical science of psychology is an impossible project.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Arnulf, J. K., Larsen, K. R., Martinsen, O. L., & Bong, C. H. (2015). Predicting survey responses: how and why semantics shape survey statistics on organizational behavior. PloS One, 9(9), 1–13.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hull, C. L., Hovland, C. I., Ross, R. T., Hall, M., Perkins, D. T., & Fitch, F. B. (1940). Mathematico-deductive theory of rote learning. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hull, C. L. (1955). A behavior system. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kukla, A. (2001). Methods of theoretical psychology. Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lamiell, J. T. (2015). Statistical thinking in psychological research. In J. Martin, J. Sugarman, & K. L. Slaney (Eds.), The Wiley handbook of theoretical and philosophical psychology (pp. 200–215). New York: Wiley Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mammen, J., & Mironenko, I. (2015). Activity theories and the ontology of psychology: learning from Danish and Russian experiences. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 49(4), 687–713.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Semin, G. R., & Krahé, B. (1987). Lay conceptions of personality: eliciting tiers of a scientific conception of personality. European Journal of Social Psychology, 17, 199–209.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Semin, G. R., & Krahé, B. (1988). Explaining perceived cross-situational consistency: intuitive psychometrics or semantic mediation? European Journal of Personality, 2, 239–252.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smedslund, G. (1997a). Some psychological theories are not empirical: a conceptual analysis of the ‘stages of change’ model. Theory & Psychology, 529–544.

  • Smedslund, J. (1997b). The structure of psychological common sense. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1997.

  • Smedslund, G. (2000). A pragmatic basis for judging models and theories in health psychology: the axiomatic method. Journal of Health Psychology, 5(2), 133–149.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Smedslund, G. (2008). All bachelors are unmarried men (p < 0.05). Quality and Quantity, 42, 53–73.

  • Smedslund, J. (1961). The utilization of probabilistic cues after 1100 and 4800 stimulus presentations. Acta Psychologica, 1961(18), 383–386.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smedslund, J. (1991). The pseudoempirical in psychology and the case for psychologic. Psychological Inquiry, 2, 325–338.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smedslund, J. (1994a). Nonempirical and empirical components in the hypotheses of five social psychological experiments. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 35, 1–15.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smedslund, J. (1994b). What kind of propositions are set forth in developmental research? Five case studies. Human Development, 37, 259–276.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smedslund, J. (2009). The mismatch between current research methods and the nature of psychological phenomena. Theory & Psychology, 19, 1–17.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smedslund, J., & Ross, L. (2014). Research-based knowledge in psychology: what if anything, is its incremental value to the practitioner? Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 43(4), 363–383.

    Google Scholar 

  • Speelman, C. P., & McGann, M. (2013). How mean is the mean? Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 1–12.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Teigen, K. H. (2002). One hundred years of laws in psychology. American Journal of Psychology., 115, 103–118.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Wallach, M. A., & Wallach, L. (1998). When experiments serve little purpose: misguided research in mainstream psychology. Theory & Psychology, 8, 183–194.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jan Smedslund.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Smedslund, J. Why Psychology Cannot be an Empirical Science. Integr. psych. behav. 50, 185–195 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-015-9339-x

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-015-9339-x

Keywords

Navigation