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Party Systems and Decentralization in Africa

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Abstract

What explains when and to what extent central governments implement decentralization? By centering on the strategic incentives that follow from the particular configuration of competitiveness and party system coherence, we propose a theory that can begin to explain the divergent outcomes in the many forms of decentralization initiated across Africa. This explanation for the extent to which robust decentralization is implemented over time suggests two counter-intuitive findings. First, authoritarian regimes may decentralize further than democratic ones, given the incentives to the hegemonic party where such reforms are initiated. Second, highly fragmented and deeply localized polities may decentralize most minimally, even where there is a broad consensus about the desirability of such reforms. We provide a first test of the theory through a comparative analysis of over a dozen countries, focusing on process tracing for Ethiopia, Botswana, Ghana, and Benin.

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Notes

  1. Africa’s current federal regimes in Ethiopia, Nigeria, Comoros, and South Africa began decentralization processes as a search for stability, initiated by central government actors who clearly viewed national unity as a constitutional imperative.

  2. We refer to any ruling party within an electoral authoritarian regime as “hegemonic” in order to differentiate between a dominant party in both types of regimes. The regime distinction is also useful for generalizability outside of Africa; strategies of decentralization in China demonstrate similar patterns, as a means of extending order and control (Landry 2008).

  3. We do not argue that partisan calculations alone drive decentralization—since the imperative of national stability matters regardless of party configuration, among other factors—but we argue that party system composition will affect a central government’s willingness to decentralize.

  4. In the Latin American context, see O’Neill 2005.

  5. This was a common strategy of rule throughout the 1970s and 1980s in the single party era across the continent (Zolberg 1966).

  6. Patronage explains this often intentional “assignment problem” where administrative and political responsibilities are not clearly allocated, which inhibits subnational governments from taking on important functions in staffing and policymaking, but keeps clients loyal to the patron through increased local linkages. We thank Jonathan Rodden for his comments on the importance of “offloading” as a decentralization strategy.

  7. See Poteete and Ribot (2011). Many ruling parties passed broad decentralization legislation in response to international pressures, but implementation has varied dramatically.

  8. FH has considered all three of our democratic cases “Free” for over a decade, with Ethiopia “Partly Free” and then “Not Free” during this period; 2011 rankings of political rights and civil liberties are: Benin: 2, 2 (Free); Botswana: 3, 2 (Free); Ghana: 1, 2 (Free); and Ethiopia 6, 6 (Not Free). The Polity IV database similarly gives our three democratic cases high ratings of 7 or 8 (of a maximum 10). For Ethiopia, the Polity score of 1 is the same as that of Zimbabwe, reflecting the coexistence of regular elections with significant restrictions on democratic practice.

  9. Whether observers argue that the EPRDF has undermined the decentralization process, there is a consensus that decentralization has been robust in tandem with the governing party developing stronger links down to local levels.

  10. On voting trends by region in Ghana, see Richard and Thomas 1993, inter alia.

  11. The District Assemblies are nominally non-partisan, but highly infused with the competitive partisan calculations that infiltrate from top to bottom in Ghana.

  12. Originally six in number, there are now 12 departments, but implementation remains incomplete (interview, Toussaint Gnonlonfoun, Director-General for State Administration, Ministry of Decentralization, Local Governance, Administration, and Territorial Management, 21 October 2010).

  13. Interview: Robert Tossou, Local Finance Expert, 21 October 2010

  14. La Territoriale 16: 24

  15. La Territoriale 16: 20. A noticeable increase in public service investment occurred in 2008, an election year at the commune level

  16. Interview, Joseph Tossavi, 22 October 2010

  17. Interview, Tossavi

  18. Interview, Tossavi

  19. Interview, Georges Houessou, Director-General for Decentralization and Local Governance, MDGLAAT, 19 October 2010)

  20. Interview, Tossou

  21. Decentralization was actually initiated under a dominant party (in the 1980s), but a two party system emerged alongside a pro-decentralization status quo.

  22. This can be the case even where party lists exist, as in Benin, depending upon the size and magnitude of electoral districts.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to acknowledge the contributions of several people who have commented on this work in various forms. These include Ed Connerley, Derese Kassa, Jonathan Rodden, Jesse Ribot, participants in the Midwest Group in African Political Economy, and the anonymous reviewers whose comments strengthened the paper greatly. Thanks are also due to numerous interviewees.

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  1. Northwestern University, 203 Scott Hall, 601 University Place, Evanston, IL, 60208, USA

    Rachel Beatty Riedl

  2. Washington and Lee University, 311 Huntley Hall, Lexington, VA, 24450, USA

    J. Tyler Dickovick

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  1. Rachel Beatty Riedl
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Correspondence to Rachel Beatty Riedl.

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Riedl, R.B., Dickovick, J.T. Party Systems and Decentralization in Africa. St Comp Int Dev 49, 321–342 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-013-9144-9

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