Income, Occupation, and Preferences for Redistribution in the Developing World

  • Stephan Haggard
  • Robert R. Kaufman
  • James D. Long
Article

Abstract

Much of the theoretical work on preferences for redistribution begins with the influential Melzer–Richard model, which makes predictions derived both from position in the income distribution and the overall level of inequality. Our evidence, however, points to limitations on such models of distributive politics. Drawing on World Values Survey evidence on preferences for redistribution in 41 developing countries, we find that the preferences of low-income groups vary significantly depending on occupation and place of residence, union members do not hold progressive views, and inequality has limited effects on demands for redistribution and may even dampen them.

Figure

Marginal Effect of Manual Workers on Preferences for Redistribution as Capshare Increases (Model 5, Table 5)

Keywords

Inequality Redistribution Developing countries Social class 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Stephan Haggard
    • 1
  • Robert R. Kaufman
    • 2
  • James D. Long
    • 3
  1. 1.Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific StudiesUniversity of California San DiegoLa JollaUSA
  2. 2.Department of Political ScienceRutgers UniversityNewarkUSA
  3. 3.Department of Political ScienceUniversity of WashingtonSeattleUSA

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