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Electoral Risk and Redistributive Politics in Mexico and the United States

  • Alberto Diaz-CayerosEmail author
Article

Abstract

What strategy does a rational party follow in allocating discretionary expenditure? This article conceives redistributive politics as an investment strategy where expenditure allocations respond to electoral risk. To show the effects of risk, it provides evidence from Pronasol in Mexico and an analysis of New Deal spending in the United States. The analysis finds that the federal administrations in both countries responded to systematic electoral risk. Spending diversification into risky voters was a rational response to chances of losing elections. The analysis hence connects electoral volatility with redistributive spending.

Keywords

New Deal Mexico Electoral volatility Party hegemony Risk Redistribution Public spending 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceStanford UniversityStanfordUSA

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