The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics

, Volume 7, Issue 4, pp 7–17 | Cite as

Pitfalls of the classical school of crime

  • Laurent Carnis
Article

Keywords

Transaction Cost Quarterly Journal American Economic Review AUSTRIAN Economic Protective Device 
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Copyright information

© Springer 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Laurent Carnis
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Paris
  2. 2.the Business School of RouenFrance

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