Cryptography and Communications

, Volume 7, Issue 3, pp 331–345 | Cite as

The parallel-cut meet-in-the-middle attack

  • Ivica Nikolić
  • Lei Wang
  • Shuang Wu


We propose a new type of meet-in-the-middle attack that splits a cryptographic primitive in parallel to the execution flow of the operations. The result of the division are two primitives that have smaller input sizes and thus require lower attack complexities. The sub-primitives are not completely independent, but mutually depend on a certain number of bits. When the number of such bits is relatively small, we show a technique based on three classical meet-in-the-middle attacks that can recover the secret key of the cipher faster than an exhaustive search. We apply our findings to the lightweight block cipher Klein and show attacks on 10/11/13 rounds of Klein-64/-80/-96. We note that our approach works in the known-plaintext attack model and requires only one or two pairs of known plaintexts.


Hash Function Block Cipher Round Function Execution Flow MITM Attack 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Nanyang Technological UniversityNanyangSingapore
  2. 2.HuaweiSingaporeSingapore

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