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Peer-to-Peer Networking and Applications

, Volume 9, Issue 1, pp 28–41 | Cite as

A scalable and automatic mechanism for resource allocation in self-organizing cloud

  • Xiaotong Wu
  • Meng Liu
  • WanChun Dou
  • Longxiang Gao
  • Shui Yu
Article

Abstract

Taking advantage of the huge potential of consumers’ untapped computing power, self-organizing cloud is a novel computing paradigm where the consumers are able to contribute/sell their computing resources. Meanwhile, host machines held by the consumers are connected by a peer-to-peer (P2P) overlay network on the Internet. In this new architecture, due to large and varying multitudes of resources and prices, it is inefficient and tedious for consumers to select the proper resource manually. Thus, there is a high demand for a scalable and automatic mechanism to accomplish resource allocation. In view of this challenge, this paper proposes two novel economic strategies based on mechanism design. Concretely, we apply the Modified Vickrey Auction (MVA) mechanism to the case where the resource is sufficient; and the Continuous Double Auction (CDA) mechanism is employed when the resource is insufficient. We also prove that aforementioned mechanisms have dominant strategy incentive compatibility. Finally, extensive experiment results are conducted to verify the performance of the proposed strategies in terms of procurement cost and execution efficiency.

Keywords

Self-organizing cloud Mechanism design Dynamic pricing Resource allocation Peer-to-peer networks 

Notes

Acknowledgments

This paper is partly supported by project National Science Foundation of China under Grant 91318301.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Xiaotong Wu
    • 1
  • Meng Liu
    • 1
  • WanChun Dou
    • 1
  • Longxiang Gao
    • 2
  • Shui Yu
    • 2
  1. 1.The State Key Laboratory for Novel Software TechnologyDepartment of Computer Science and Technology, Nanjing UniversityNanjingChina
  2. 2.School of Information TechnologyDeakin UniversityVICAustralia

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