Peer-to-Peer Networking and Applications

, Volume 4, Issue 4, pp 325–345 | Cite as

mSSL: A framework for trusted and incentivized peer-to-peer data sharing between distrusted and selfish clients

Article

Abstract

Conventional client-server applications can be enhanced by enabling peer-to-peer data sharing between the clients, greatly reducing the scalability concern when a large number of clients access a single server. However, for these “hybrid peer-to-peer applications,” obtaining data from peer clients may not be secure, and clients may lack incentives in providing or receiving data from their peers. In this paper, we describe our mSSL framework that encompasses key security and incentive functions that hybrid peer-to-peer applications can selectively invoke based on their need. In contrast to the conventional SSL protocol that only protects client-server connections, mSSL not only supports client authentication and data confidentiality, but also ensures data integrity through a novel exploit of Merkle hash trees, all under the assumption that data sharing can be between untrustworthy clients. Moreover, with mSSL’s incentive functions, any client that provides data to its peers can also obtain accurate proofs or digital money for its service securely and reliably. Our evaluation further shows that mSSL is not only fast and effective, but also has a reasonable overhead.

Keywords

Hybrid peer-to-peer application Peer-to-peer security Data sharing incentive Data integrity Proof of service Atomic purchase mSSL SSL 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Computer and Information ScienceUniversity of OregonEugeneUSA

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