Landowners’ ability to leverage in negotiations over habitat conservation
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Voluntary conservation agreements are commonly used to stem the impact of habitat destruction and degradation on terrestrial biodiversity. Past studies that aim to inform how resources for conservation should be allocated across land parcels have assumed the costs of securing conservation on sites can be estimated solely on the basis of the value of alternative land uses. However, in a voluntary negotiation, a landowner could hold-out for a higher payment based on a conservation group or agency’s willingness-to-pay by leveraging the value of biodiversity on the property. We examine landowners’ ability to leverage and the consequences for conservation planning. To explore this, we first use an analytical approximation that simplifies the situation to one where a conservation group prioritizes one site for acquisition. Landowners’ ability to hold-out for higher payments in this situation ranges from approximately 17% to 55% of the value of alternative land uses on the site. We show that landowners’ ability to hold-out for higher payments is more sensitive to variance in the value of alternative land uses than variance in the biodiversity value across properties and is highest when the two factors negatively covary. Next, we consider multi-site selection decisions accounting for community complementarity across parcels. We find that leverage potential can be significantly higher in this context, with a maximum increase of 237% of the value of alternative land uses, and that community irreplaceability is correlated with landowners’ ability to leverage. If one landowner holds out for a higher payment, it has implications for what other parcels should be priorities for protection.
KeywordsConservation planning Habitat conservation Conservation costs Irreplaceability Hold-outs
G.D.L. was funded by a Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) Studentship. M.D. was funded as part of the UK Research Councils’ Rural Economy and Land Use Programme (RELU). RELU is a collaboration between the Economic and Social Research Council, NERC and the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council, with additional funding from Defra and the Scottish Government. Thanks also go to the authors of several studies whose data was used in the sections “Estimate of leverage potential for single site problem from empirical data” and “Multi-site selections” as well as to the two anonymous reviewers who provided valuable insights and suggestions. Finally, G.D.L would like to thank Ana Aguilar Ojeda for her helpful discussions and support throughout.
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