Abstract
Science is an activity of the human intellect and as such has ethical implications that should be reviewed and taken into account. Although science and ethics have conventionally been considered different, it is herewith proposed that they are essentially similar. The proposal set henceforth is to create a new ethics rooted in science: scientific ethics. Science has firm axiological foundations and searches for truth (as a value, axiology) and knowledge (epistemology). Hence, science cannot be value neutral. Looking at standard scientific principles, it is possible to construct a scientific ethic (that is, an ethical framework based on scientific methods and rules), which can be applied to all sciences. These intellectual standards include the search for truth (honesty and its derivatives), human dignity (and by reflection the dignity of all animals) and respect for life. Through these it is thence achievable to draft a foundation of a ethics based purely on science and applicable beyond the confines of science. A few applications of these will be presented. Scientific ethics can have vast applications in other fields even in non scientific ones.
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Notes
The Author referred to the continuity–discontinuity debate where continuity theorists considered ethics as a science or at least having deep similarities with it, while discontinuity theorists reject such equivalency, but still may claim that ethics does deal with objective truths and universalizable statements.
The Author hypertrophied the previous definition of ethics from the ‘enquiry into what is good’ to that of the ‘enquiry into what is valuable or important with regards to the meaning of life (the right way of living)’. Indeed, the term morals comes from the Latin ‘morales’, which Cicero did use to translate the Greek ‘ethicos’ (ethics), thus confirming the long-standing tradition of synonymity of the two words (Ciulla 2004). Albeit synonyms, some philosophers like to distinguish the two terms, whereby ethics is concerned with social values while morals is about personal values. From this, different jobs may or may not be created.
These actions include the academic pursuit itself of any intellectual discipline (even the most contemplative and theoretical), because it relates to the choice on how to conduct a part of one’s life. These actions are then coupled with ethics’ other practical aspect, that of ‘doing ethics’ (that is, the realization of the actions that allow us to participate in the goods defined by ethics).
This definition clearly identifies the area of study of science (the physical world), the method of study (the scientific method) and the result of such a study (knowledge of truths and general laws). Humans, who want to study the physical world and through reason (and experiments by means of the scientific method) generate truths and discover laws about the physical world, will ‘do’ science.
In the sense proposed by Carter and Little (2007), epistemology is defined as the study of the nature of knowledge and its justification. Similarly, the authors prefer to consider methodology as the study (the description, the explanation, and the justification) of methods of a research in a particular approach to inquiry, rather than the methods themselves.
Science derives from the Latin ‘scientia’ and is translated in German as ‘wissenschaften’ (Meinel 1983). Scientia is ‘episteme’, for Aristotle (the study of the causes and reasons), and has been differentiated from technology and art (Weingart 2010), The concept of science is clearly more complex than what is being conveyed, but the focus of this writing is on the essential ethical element of science.
Further developments on this idea will be clarified when discussing the value of truth in later sections.
Or for this reason, any human intervention. Furthermore, science has a peculiar nature of having impact on mankind in multifarious ways (from early theoretical research to its final application stage), a social nature if we will consider it, as earlier identified by Longino (1990).
Wittgenstein stated that ‘mere description of these facts will contain nothing which we could call an ethical proposition’ in reference to science.
The authors clarify that all knowledge generated by a research project is always discussed, evaluated, and justified in relation to broader cultural values and never as data in isolation. A more thorough justification of the relation between epistemology and axiology is exposed in the section dealing with truth.
The author sustained a position of quasi-continuity, wherein ethics and science are seen as equal partners. Although, this is the only similitude that can be found between what I shall define temporarily in the following manner: ‘science as a substet of ethics’. The only similarity, as I was stating, because I move away from a limited perspective of science as defining ethics (with the four inferred areas of collaboration being neurobiological research into the basis of moral judgment, comparative anthropology, comparative evolutionary biology, and game-theoretical modeling), to depict a version of ethics as defining science.
Because there is only one way of doing proper science and many ways of doing ‘bad’ science, misconduct may result in not adhering to a universally accepted way of doing science (as defined above). Adherence to the scientific method is considered ‘good’ and the only way, so too there are many ethical positions which are bad and not convenient for doing science. As explicitly identified by Moss and Edmonds (2005), there is a difference between good and bad science: Good science is seen as a set of steps that enables a researcher to understand what we observe in nature. In fact, the goodness or badness of science is related to how closely this corresponds to the observation and ‘telling the truth’. We are capable of giving a quality of good or bad to the way we are ‘doing science’ based on the intrinsic and universal aspects of science itself. In fact, Lüscher (2013) confirmed that any deviations from the accepted practice in obtaining, analysing, and reporting results may be reconnected, in a greater or lesser order of magnitude, to bad science (whether this is sloppiness and trimming of data, or falsification, fabrication, and outright invention, at its worst case). This is also the fundamental aspect of axiology. Hurst (2011) indeed claims that the first axiom of axiology is the definition of good as concept fulfilment. This will be clarified in the next sections.
Peculiarly, the intellectual (general) standards are also fundamental in our understanding and used for critical reasoning for content of any kind.
As defined by Del Re (2001), deontological ethics deals with the right action to perform in any given circumstance and the nature of duty (the law), without regard to motives or ends, whilst axiology deals primarily with the value of the motives and ends of any action. Axiology is the science of values and one of the three most general philosophical sciences (Bahm 1993, pp. 3–4), the other two being epistemology and metaphysics (or ontology). As a result, the first component relates to the profession that a scientist takes on. Every profession has a standard codification of rules and duties (deon in Greek) that each practitioner of that profession must adhere to. There may also be more general rules, which, once founded and established, can serve as the basis for making moral decisions and can be applied in specific situations (Williams 2015, p. 17). The second component relates to the general value of the ethical principle in itself and can be linked to a specific character trait (the morals). Ontologically, the values are included in the virtues that make up a person. Instead of feeling constrained to obey to the ethics of science, it should be more like becoming acquainted to the good habits of moral actions (a.k.a., good scientific practice).
Dougherty (2013) clarifies that this neutrality of agency is linked to consequentialist positions. Consequentialism indeed claim that the ultimate ‘agent-neutral’’ goal is bringing about the impersonally best outcome, since it is the same goal for all agents, whoever they are.
There is certainly an unavoidable level of subjectivity in science which is given, according to Schwartz et al. (1994), by both presently accepted scientific theories and laws, and by personal values, agendas, and prior experiences. The problem of subjectivity is much more evident in qualitative methodologies of research in science. Ratner (2002) confirms that in qualitative research, subjectivity leads everything from the choice of topic that one studies, to formulating hypotheses, to selecting methodologies, and interpreting data, although this last one is also applicable to quantitative research.
This situation applies only to voluntary deception. There are many cases in history where previous scientific theories have been modified and eventually superseded, such as the theories of light (Schurz 2014, pp. 278–291),
It is imperative that scientists learn and use the two aspects of honesty (Naagarazan 2006, p. 11): (a) Truthfulness (maintenance of truth, defending the truth, and communicating the truth in all situations no matter what happens or whom they are going against); and (b) Trustworthiness (maintaining integrity, reliability and authenticity and taking responsibility for personal performance).
In the above sense, honesty is inevitably seen as a character trait, a habit that has to be cultivated in order for it to become part and parcel with the scientist. Honesty then equates, for a scientist, to truth-telling (truthfulness). As per Etzioni’s (2002) account, truth-telling is a self-evident metaphysical value, charged with moral truth that speaks to us in compelling terms
The author justifies human dignity still in terms of evolutionary continuity. The following features have been noted:
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(a)
Cumulative transmissible culture: animals do not form culture or it is only genetically transmitted;
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(b)
intentional ideational teaching: some animal activities may be interpreted as (behavioral) teaching, but this is never deliberate;
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Ideational linguistics: Humans can process thoughts, ideas, symbolic abstractions;
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(d)
Ideographic uniqueness: Humans have a capacity for enacted individuality as interpreted story;
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Interactive brain plasticity: the information from personal psychological experience can be limitless;
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Social creativity: with the potential to forge endless thoughts and imaginations, human mind acquires its identity;
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existential dignity: a personhood is derived from an experiencing subjectivity with personal identity;
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(h)
differentiated individuality: humans can articulate self-reflection about status and encountered behaviour in the view of others as an existential inwardly claim of a proper persona;
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phenomenological self-identity: humans have an extra sense of a goal or norm as objects of contemplation;
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Separate ethical contemplation: deliberate reflection on how to treat others fairly, assess their belief system, etc.;
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Moral responsibility: awareness of the mental others as existential subjects capable of contemplating conscience.
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(a)
The two most important human cognitive functions, consciousness and language, interact to produce internalized ‘‘inner” speech, which is conscious thought with a verbal (and, on occasion, visual or photographic) structure. And it is thought also that this could generate the introspective capacity (like reflective- and self-awareness), and possibly have neurocognitive links with meta-cognitive abilities, mindfulness and interoceptive awareness.
In this sense, the author, citing John Sulston, refers to the complexity of a control mechanism (the machinery of epigenetics), overlaid by the unique experience of each individual (from the environment as modulator of epigenetics), means that we must continue to treat every human as unique and special, and not imagine that we can predict the course of a human life (basing this judgement on mere genetic knowledge), other than in broad terms.
Currently, the debate is not over, since, apart from the mechanistic and pragmatic neurophysiological hypothesis (including cognitive and information theory approaches) on the nature of consciousness by the monists, there are other two general classes of hypotheses, broadly proposed by the dualists (Facco et al. 2017): quantum theory hypotheses, and non-local consciousness (with extended versions). These two sets of theories have been brilliantly developed over the last 30 years (Tarlacı and Pregnolato 2016). Gennaro (2005) is adamant in stating that metaphysical dualism as opposed to materialism (monism) are at the two extremes of an ongoing debate in philosophy and science. It is the case that even now, 400 years after Descartes’ proposal of the mind being immaterial, we still do not know the ultimate fundamental nature of the ‘res cogitans’, the mind (Amoroso 2015), although some scientists argue that it is based on material (chemicals and cells). But, Tressoldi et al. (2017) sustained that while the monists (mind = brain) can explain local phenomena (or Q, qualia experiences), they are far from achieving the target of explaining the several nonlocal Qs, how can these causally change neural activities, or how can free choices emerge from nondeterministic neural patterns (as do first person Q experiences). The mind–body problem is a vast topic where many philosophers and scientists have taken up a huge amount of effort and time to clarify, explain and identify the basic workings of consciousness, but it is still an unresolved issue. Maybe and maybe not, the mind–body problem will continue to be so for a long time to come, at least until science realizes that (1) rational materialistic explanations on nonlocal Qs are beyond its scope; and (2) mathematical possibilities of consciousness to occur are so staggeringly high that defies all scientific reductionist explanation.
The one characteristic of personhood, though not solely constitutive by itself, is the shareable properties of self-consciousness, rationality and the capacity to act for ends: these make a being a person with infinite value, a ‘who’ not a ‘what’, conscious of itself being a conscious ‘I’. The other is its irreplaceability, as an aspect of dignity: here Zagzebski (2001) confronts the notion of incommunicability (personal mental state) and subjectivity (perceived by two different subjects) by merging it into one non-shareable notion, the incommunicable subjectivity.
A separate case would be when an individual breaks some convened societal law. The necessary steps to be taken by a society (the law-enforcement section of any society: police, judge, jury, etc.) may be to ensure the safety of other individuals by reducing the liberty of the law-breaker. His/her dignity still remains inviolable, but the reduction of freedom might be a necessary ‘price to pay’. This is clearly a topic of applied ethics. A couple of examples are concisely reviewed in section.
It should be noted that the interpretation and application of the norm may differ in light of the scientists’ own values and life experiences and based on different understandings of what it means to be a human being (Resnik 2011). This is even more so real in extreme cases, i.e., the more life is fragile and undefended, the more strongly should science operate in its defence.
Other important aspects of science’s respect for life derive from the realization of the interconnectedness of all life and the desire not to destroy this delicate balance between us all (teleological view). Moreover, a reflection of the importance of respect for nature and its laws also as the object of study (respect for the subject) can follow from the contemplation that every living creature, whether it is plant or animal, has a unique characteristic and combination of genetic, morphologic, behavioural and informational structures that render them absolutely peculiar and exceptional.
Science acknowledges that the measurement problem is not only valid in quantum physics but is transcendently applicable to all nature and all its content. Simply put, if an observation is made, it will affect the state of the object. This is inherently valid in nature, and thus science will try to observe in a way that least affects any object so as to obtain information and data of its natural (unaffected) state as closely as possible.
In these cases, the concerns of the citizen (social), full of subjective opinions, may mingle with the duty (deontology) of the scientist, who is responsible to provide an unbiased and objective belief or assessment on a specific practical scientific question. It must then be intelligibly clarified under which capacity is he or she proffering a statement. Failure to do so would be against the honesty implicit in science and could harm the societal structure of dignity-rich human beings, as an unforeseen outcome (Resnik 2005, p. 131).
Until such a time when it can come up with a new design that will avoid any suffering. There is a waiver, though to this concept and it is the informed consent. In a clinical trial setting, the investigator may explain the novel procedure or method to the subject (virtually informing them of the possible harmful consequences, to the best of the investigator’s knowledge at that time). Only after a review of the truthful information provided, the subject is in a position to voluntarily give his/her consent to proceed with the experimentation. The stress here is on truthful information, possible harm in reference to consequences, and best knowledge at the time of the proposal.
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Menapace, M. Scientific Ethics: A New Approach. Sci Eng Ethics 25, 1193–1216 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-018-0050-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-018-0050-4