Influence of strategy continuity on cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma games with migrating players
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The phenomenon of cooperation is prevalent in both nature and human society. In this paper a simulative model is developed to examine how the strategy continuity influences cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s games in which the players migrate through the success-driven migration mechanism. Numerical simulations illustrate that the strategy continuity promotes cooperation at a low rate of migration, while impeding cooperation when the migration rate is higher. The influence of strategy continuity is also dependent on the game types. Through a more dynamic analysis, the different effects of the strategy continuity at low and high rates of migration are explained by the formation, expansion, and extinction of the self-assembled clusters of “partial- cooperators” within the gaming population.
Keywordsevolution of cooperation continuous strategies spatial prisoner’s dilemma game migration
CLC numberN93 N94
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