Review of Managerial Science

, Volume 11, Issue 2, pp 411–442 | Cite as

A co-utility approach to the mesh economy: the crowd-based business model

  • Abeba Nigussie Turi
  • Josep Domingo-Ferrer
  • David Sánchez
  • Dritan Osmani
Original Paper

Abstract

We explore the mesh economy applications of co-utility, a new concept describing self-enforcing and mutually beneficial interactions among self-interested agents. We show that the crowdsourcing market is naturally co-utile (without additional incentives). Furthermore, we analyze the investment crowdfunding industry and propose solutions that can neutralize the fear and mistrust effects underlying its market in order to make it strictly co-utile. Up on our analysis under the co-utility framework, we corroborate that collaboration is always rationally sustainable, as long as the system is co-utile and that all co-utile outcomes are Pareto-optimal; but not all Pareto-optimal outcomes are co-utile. In addition, reciprocity and hybridity equilibrium are compatible with co-utility in specific cases at which they provide Pareto-optimal outcomes. This methodology of analysis within the framework of co-utility can be extended beyond the crowd-based business models and promises to significantly contribute to economic theory.

Keywords

Business model Co-utility Crowdsourcing Investment crowdfunding Mesh Economy 

JEL Classification

B41 C7 D81 M21 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Abeba Nigussie Turi
    • 1
  • Josep Domingo-Ferrer
    • 1
  • David Sánchez
    • 1
  • Dritan Osmani
    • 1
  1. 1.UNESCO Chair in Data Privacy, Department of Computer Engineering and MathematicsUniversitat Rovira i VirgiliTarragonaSpain

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