Abstract
James Anderson and Greg Welty have resurrected an argument for God’s existence (Anderson and Welty 2011), which we will call the argument from logic. We present three lines of response against the argument, involving the notion of necessity involved, the notion of intentionality involved, and then we pose a dilemma for divine conceptualism. We conclude that the argument faces substantial problems.
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Notes
This is a distinction Anderson and Welty recognise in footnote 31.
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Malpass, A. Problems for the Argument from Logic: a Response to the Lord of Non-Contradiction. SOPHIA 60, 239–253 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-020-00777-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-020-00777-6