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Sophia

pp 1–34 | Cite as

The Force of Existence. Looking for Spinoza in Heidegger

  • Kasper Lysemose
Article

Abstract

In the perhaps most decisive reopening of philosophy in the twentieth century, Heidegger presented an existential analytic. This can be viewed as the highly complex analysis of one simple action: being-there (Dasein). In the paper at hand, a Spinozist interpretation of this action is proposed. This implies a shift in the Aristotelian conceptuality, which, to a large extent, informs Heidegger’s analysis. The action of being-there is not a movement from potentiality (δύναμις) to actuality (ἐνέργεια). It is a force of existence (vis existendi). However, this force is located right at the threshold between potentiality and actuality. Accordingly, it is not a matter of dismissing Aristotle’s concepts, but—with Heidegger—to observe carefully their deconstruction and pursue it to the point where these concepts become indistinct and where—beyond Heidegger—a Spinozian force of existence emerges.

Keywords

Heidegger Spinoza Drive Force Actuality Potentiality 

Notes

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Copenhagen SDenmark

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