Abstract
Alvin Plantinga has famously argued that the naturalist who accepts evolutionary theory has a defeater for all of her beliefs, including her belief in naturalism and evolution. Hence, he says, naturalism, when conjoined with evolution, is self-defeating and cannot be rationally accepted. This is known as the evolutionary argument against naturalism (EAAN). However, Tyler Wunder (Religious Studies 51:391–399, 2015) has recently shown that if the EAAN is framed in terms of objective probability and theism is assumed to be non-contingent, then either theism is necessarily false or the EAAN is unsound. Neither option is attractive to the proponent of the EAAN. Perry Hendricks (Religious Studies 1–5, 2018) has responded to Wunder’s criticism, showing that the EAAN can be salvaged and, indeed, strengthened, by framing it in terms not of naturalism (N), but of a proposition that is entailed by N that is also consistent with theism. We will show that once Hendricks’ solution to Wunder’s objection is accepted, a puzzle ensues: if the EAAN provides the naturalist with a defeater for all of her beliefs, then an extension of it appears to provide God with a defeater for all of his beliefs. After bringing out this puzzle, we suggest several ways in which the proponent of the EAAN might solve it, but also show some potential weaknesses in these purported solutions. Whether the solutions to the puzzle that we consider ultimately succeed is unclear to us. (Translation: the authors disagree. One author thinks that the solutions (or, at least, some of them) that we consider do solve the puzzle while the other author does not.) However, it is clear to us that this is an issue that proponents of the EAAN need to address.
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Notes
More specifically, E denotes the thesis that we humans have come to be by way of evolution as it is (at least roughly) currently understood.
We are rough and brief here since whether the EAAN is sound is not of interest for this article. Rather, we are interested in its implications for God’s beliefs.
Wunder (2015) expresses worries about Plantinga’s retreat to epistemic probability in the EAAN on account of Plantinga’s view of how epistemic probability is grounded. Whether the retreat to epistemic probability is actually problematic is not relevant to our article, so we will not address it further. Though, see Collins (2009) for a defense of the use of epistemic probabilities in science.
Bosse (2018: 141) notes that Wunder’s objection can be applied to any argument using ‘propositions in the form of ‘P(Z/X) > P(Z/Y)’ where ‘X’ and ‘Y’ are mutually exclusive and one of them is non-contingent.’
For the purposes of this paper, we have bracketed the issue of materialism and how it relates to the EAAN.
Plantinga notes that the fact that P (the function of perspiration is to cool the body/N&E) is low does not mean N&E is a defeater for perspiration. The point is that defeat only happens between certain propositions.
A defeater-deflector is a belief B that prevents a defeater D from defeating a belief X in the first place. A defeater-defeater is a belief B that defeats the defeater D after D has defeated belief X.
‘Which beliefs are such that they can properly function as defeater-deflectors? Which beliefs are admissible in this context—that is, which beliefs X are such that if P(R/N&E&X) is not low, then X is a defeater-deflector for R and N&E and P(R/N&E) is low? This is the conditionalization problem’ (Plantinga 2011a: p. 347).
See Plantinga (2002) for more on the XX drug.
What is it that makes the connection between O and R non-trivial? Briefly, for any being that is omniscient, R will hold of that being. There are, of course, significant differences between R and O. But we regard the previously mentioned fact as sufficient to render the connection non-trivial.
Plantinga says, ‘[b]ut even if we cannot easily come up with a rigorous statement of necessary and sufficient conditions for admissibility, we can still see some obvious necessary conditions. R itself is not admissible, and the same goes for any belief equivalent in the broadly logical sense to R (for example, Rv 2 + 1 = 4) as well as any belief that together with N, or E, or their disjunction entails R (for example, N ⊃ R).’ (2011b: p. 440).
It is worth noting that Richard Otte in Beilby (2002) thinks that R cannot serve as a defeater-deflector because it would beg the question in an important sense.
At least, it will for those who do not hold that the concept ‘heap’ is vague.
There is an interesting consequence that arises from this section. Suppose God does stave off defeat while the demigod does not. Is there another defeater-deflector that can save the demigod? If the reasoning behind the original EAAN is correct, it is hard to see how. Without a designing agent, natural selection is the only game in town, and he has thrust back upon the original EAAN. So, if the strategy in this section is right, it seems that—in the absence of a design plan—not only is the belief that it is impossible to have your R defeated sufficient to stave off defeat, it is also necessary. (Though, perhaps a demigod could appeal to some of the other responses, we consider below, e.g., the medieval theory of analogy.)
Plantinga also seems to endorse epistemically circular arguments for R, as long as R has not been questioned or doubted (Beilby 2002, p. 241).
Inductive arguments, in general, are not logically circular.
To be clear, Plantinga (2000: p. 125) does not think that even God can give a non-circular argument for the reliability of his cognitive faculties.
See Moreland and Craig (2003: p. 521).
Another interesting issue raised by invoking the medieval theory of analogy is the potential for the medieval theory of analogy to become a double-edged sword. If God’s knowledge, and the like, is to be understood analogously, one wonders if God’s design plan for us is also to be understood analogously. If that is true, then the question arises as to why it would not undermine, at least to some degree, whether humans satisfy the design plan condition for warrant. In other words, is a design plan in the analogous sense close enough to a design plan in the univocal sense, such that humans satisfy that condition for warrant? We leave this issue unsettled, as it is outside the scope of the paper.
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Thanks to G.L.G. - Colin Patrick Mitchell - for particularly insightful comments on this article.
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Hendricks, P., Anderson, T. Does the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism Defeat God’s Beliefs?. SOPHIA 59, 489–499 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-019-00748-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-019-00748-6