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Sophia

, Volume 57, Issue 1, pp 85–101 | Cite as

Animals with Soul

  • Joshua C. ThurowEmail author
Article
  • 134 Downloads

Abstract

I argue that ensouled animalism—the view that we are identical to animals that have immaterial souls as parts—has a pair of advantages over its two nearest rivals, materialistic animalism and pure dualism. Contra pure dualism, ensouled animalism can explain how physical predications can be literally true of us. Contra materialistic animalism, ensouled animalism can explain how animals can survive death (without resorting to body snatching or body fissioning). Furthermore, ensouled animalism has these advantages without creating any problems beyond those already faced by animalism and by belief in souls. However, some animalists, including Eric Olson, think that animals cannot have immaterial parts. I present a sufficient condition for animal parthood that implies animals can have immaterial parts. Ensouled animalism is not only possible, but also doubly attractive.

Keywords

Animalism Soul Personal identity Survival 

Notes

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Thom Atkinson, Mike Almeida, Mark Murphy, anonymous referees, and an audience at the 2014 Eastern SCP meeting for their helpful advice on this paper. I dedicate this paper to the memory of my grandfather Gary Karenz.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Texas at San AntonioSan AntonioUSA

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