, Volume 56, Issue 2, pp 207–225 | Cite as

On the Concept of Theodicy

  • Ricardo Sousa SilvestreEmail author


My purpose in this paper is to clarify or explicate the concept of theodicy. More specifically, I shall provide an account of the concept that takes its logical aspects seriously into consideration as well as satisfies the basic intuitions philosophers of religions have had about it. This shall be done by systematically analysing the several theodical conditions found in the literature. As it shall be seen, these conditions are logically related to one another; collectively, they point not to one, but to several concepts of theodicy. Thus, as by-product of this explicatory endeavour, I shall provide a logically guided, I may say, analysis of such conditions as well as a systematization of the theodical concepts arising from them. I shall follow what might be termed a semiformal approach; despite not developing a full logical theory, I use the standard notation and some important results from the field of formal logic.


Concept explication Theodicy Problem of evil Logical analysis 


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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Federal University of Campina GrandeCampina GrandeBrazil

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