, Volume 56, Issue 4, pp 573–587 | Cite as

The Open Future Square of Opposition: a Defense

  • Elijah Hess


This essay explores the validity of Gregory Boyd’s open theistic account of the nature of the future. In particular, it is an investigation into whether Boyd’s logical square of opposition for future contingents provides a model of reality for free will theists that can preserve both bivalence and a classical conception of omniscience. In what follows, I argue that it can.


Open theism Molinism Gregory Boyd William Lane Craig Open future 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of ArkansasFayettevilleUSA

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