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Sophia

, Volume 55, Issue 3, pp 381–394 | Cite as

From Emergence Theory to Panpsychism—A Philosophical Evaluation of Nancey Murphy’s Non-reductive Physicalism

  • Mikael Leidenhag
Article

Abstract

In this article, I offer a critical evaluation of non-reductive physicalism as articulated and defended by Nancey Murphy. I argue that (A) the examples given by Murphy do not illustrate robust emergence and the philosophical idea of downward causation. (B) The thesis of multiple realizability is ontologically neutral, and so cannot support the idea of the causal efficacy of higher-level properties. (C) Supervenience is incompatible with strong emergence. I also argue for the fruitful relationship between emergence theory and panpsychism pertaining to the metaphysical issue of the origin and nature of mind.

Keywords

Emergence theory Nancey Murphy Panpsychism Causal powers 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Uppsala UniversityUppsalaSweden

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