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Sophia

, 48:351 | Cite as

The Anthropic Argument Against the Existence of God

  • Mark WalkerEmail author
Article

Abstract

If God is morally perfect then He must perform the morally best actions, but creating humans is not the morally best action. If this line of reasoning can be maintained then the mere fact that humans exist contradicts the claim that God exists. This is the ‘anthropic argument’. The anthropic argument, is related to, but distinct from, the traditional argument from evil. The anthropic argument forces us to consider the ‘creation question’: why did God not create other gods rather than humans? That is, if God is omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect then why didn’t He create a world populated exclusively by beings that are perfect in the same way that He is—ontological equivalents— rather than choosing to create humans with finite natures and all the suffering that this entails?

Keywords

Problem of evil God Free will Plantinga 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Richard L. Hedden Chair of Advanced Philosophical Studies, Department of PhilosophyNew Mexico State UniversityLas CrucesUSA

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