Abstract
In this paper I discuss a number of problems associated with the suggestion that it is possible for God to randomly select a possible world for actualization.
Keywords
God Creation Howard-SnydersNotes
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Stephen Grover and an anonymous reviewer for comments on a draft of this paper. Thanks are also due to Ian Hacking for a helpful correspondence during the early stages of my thinking about this topic.
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