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Evolution trend analysis of urban residents’ low-carbon travel development based on multidimensional game theory

基于多维博弈的城市居民低碳出行演化趋势分析

Abstract

In the travel process of urban residents, travelers will take a series of activities such as imitation and exclusion by observing other people’s travel modes, which affects their following trips. This process can be seen as a repeated game between members of the travelers. Based on the analysis of this game and its evolution trend, a multi-dimensional game model of low-carbon travel for residents is established. The two dimensional game strategies include whether to accept the low-carbon concept and whether to choose low-carbon travel. Combined with evolutionary game theory, the low-carbon travel choices of residents in different cities are simulated, and the evolutionary stability strategies are obtained. Finally, the influences of the main parameters of the model on the evolution process and stability strategies are discussed. The results show that travelers would develop towards two trends. Cities with more developed public traffic system have a higher proportion of receiving low-carbon concept and choosing low-carbon travel. Cities with underdeveloped public transport system could increase this proportion by some measures such as encouraging residents to choose slow transport and increasing the propaganda of low-carbon travel, but the positive effects of the measures like propaganda have a limited impact on the proportion.

摘要

在考虑低碳因素的城市居民出行过程中, 出行者会通过观察其他人的出行方式, 产生模仿、排 斥等一系列活动, 从而影响到后续的出行, 由此过程可以看作出行群体成员之间的反复博弈. 本文在 对低碳背景下出行群体的这种博弈及其演化趋势分析的基础上, 把交通方式的选择和是否接收低碳理 念作为策略的两个维度, 建立了居民低碳出行多维博弈模型, 并结合演化博弈理论对不同城市居民的 低碳出行选择进行仿真, 得到选择的演化稳定策略, 进而讨论了模型主要参数变化对演化过程及稳定 策略的影响. 结果表明, 城市出行者将向着演化稳定策略的趋势发展. 公共交通越发达的城市, 接受 低碳理念并选择低碳出行的比例越高. 公共交通不够发达的城市可以通过鼓励个人慢行交通, 加大对 低碳出行的宣传等措施提高这个比例, 但宣传等做法带来的积极效果较为有限.

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Author information

Correspondence to Xiao-hui Wu 武晓晖.

Additional information

Foundation item: Project(BK20160512) supported by the Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province, China; Project(16YJCZH027) supported by the Humanity and Social Science Youth Foundation of Ministry of Education of China; Project(15GLC004) supported by the Social Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province, China

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Wu, X., He, M., Cao, S. et al. Evolution trend analysis of urban residents’ low-carbon travel development based on multidimensional game theory. J. Cent. South Univ. 26, 3388–3396 (2019) doi:10.1007/s11771-019-4261-x

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Key words

  • low-carbon travel
  • evolution trend
  • multidimensional game
  • travel modes

关键词

  • 低碳出行
  • 演化
  • 多维博弈
  • 出行方式