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, Volume 27, Issue 1, pp 1–23 | Cite as

Recent developments in the queueing problem

  • Youngsub ChunEmail author
  • Manipushpak Mitra
  • Suresh Mutuswami
Invited Paper
  • 175 Downloads

Abstract

A group of agents must be served in a facility. The facility can serve only one agent at a time and agents incur waiting costs. The queueing problems is concerned with finding the order to serve agents and the monetary transfers. It can be solved by taking various approaches: the cooperative game theoretic approach, the normative approach, the strategic approach, the bargaining approach, and the combination of these approaches. In this paper, we provide a survey on the recent developments in the queueing problem.

Keywords

Queueing problem Cooperative game theoretic approach Normative approach Strategic approach Bargaining approach 

JEL Classification

C72 D63 D82 

Notes

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Copyright information

© Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Youngsub Chun
    • 1
    Email author
  • Manipushpak Mitra
    • 2
  • Suresh Mutuswami
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsSeoul National UniversitySeoulSouth Korea
  2. 2.Economic Research UnitIndian Statistical InstituteKolkataIndia
  3. 3.Economics Division, School of BusinessUniversity of LeicesterLeicesterUK

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