New characterizations of the Owen and Banzhaf–Owen values using the intracoalitional balanced contributions property
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In this paper, several characterizations of the Owen and the Banzhaf–Owen values are provided. All the characterizations make use of a property based on the principle of balanced contributions. This property is called the intracoalitional balanced contributions property and was defined by Calvo et al. (Math Soc Sci 31:171–182, 1996).
KeywordsCooperative game Shapley value Banzhaf value Coalition structure Balanced contributions
Mathematics Subject Classification91A12
Financial support from Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología through Grant ECO2011-23460 and from Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad through Grant MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P is gratefully acknowledged. Partial support from Xunta de Galicia through Grants ED431G/012016-2019 and ED431C2016-015 is gratefully acknowledged. I am also very grateful for the interesting comments of two anonymous referees.
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